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An today's dynamic global economy, 
the economic importance of smaller 
metropolitan areas in the United States 
may be declining. Many of these areas 
have lost their major corporate 
stakeholders through mergers and 
acquisitions and have been downgraded to 
"branch site" locations. Moreover, few 
offer the thick labor markets and social/ 
cultural environment sought by 
professional workers. The public policy 
initiatives available to these metropolitan 
areas often are very limited due to budget 
and legal constraints.
We are worried about the future of 
these areas and have been working to gain 
a better understanding of how they grow 
by identifying local public policies that 
facilitate and nurture economic growth. 
This article describes our current 
approach and initial findings.
In brief, our aim is to identify small 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)  
which the U.S. Census defines as those 
that housed fewer than one million 
residents in 1990 that experienced 
better than expected growth during the 
1990s. After these "winning" MSAs are 
identified, we hope to find the salient 
public policies that significantly 
contributed to their success.
Identifying the Better-Than- 
Expected Performers
To identify MSAs that have enjoyed 
better-than-expected growth, it is 
necessary to construct a predictive model 
that estimates the expected growth of 
MSAs given their economic, social, and 
physical/geographic attributes. The 
explanatory variables we used in our 
predictive model of the growth in 
personal income during the 1990s for the 
261 small MSAs can be categorized into 
the following four groups:
1) Structural. These variables 
controlled for the MSA's industrial mix 
relative to the nation's, and the economic 
health of its entrepreneur/small business 
base at the start of the 1990s.
2) Human capital. These variables 
controlled for the educational levels of the 
area's adults at the start of the decade.
3) Quality of life. These included 
control variables for the area's regional 
location, climate factor, and crime levels.
4) Historical trends. These variables 
controlled for the area's economic 
performance in the previous decade.
A full description of the regression 
model and its results are available in our 
forthcoming Upjohn Institute Working 
Paper, "Small Cities Blues: Looking for
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Growth Factors in Small and Medium- 
Sized Cities."
Results
The model explained 72 percent of the 
variation of the dependent variable, 
personal income growth, as measured by 
the standard adjusted R-square statistic. 
Using this model to generate the predicted 
growth of all the 261 MS As, we then 
ranked in order the areas according to the 
difference between their actual and the 
model-predicted growth during the 1990s. 
The resulting top 10 metropolitan areas 
are shown in Table 1. Many of the listed 
metropolitan areas are well known and 
have made their way to the top of major 
"Best Cities" polls and indexes published 
annually. Others, such as Sioux Falls, 
South Dakota; Laredo, Texas; and 
Fayetteville, North Carolina; are seldom 
seen in the winner's circle.
Conversely, it is instructive to examine 
the metropolitan areas that experienced 
lower-than-expected growth as well. The 
5 metropolitan areas that were the least 
successful in meeting the model's growth 
expectations were Melbourne, Florida; 
Auburn, Alabama; Merced, California, 
Fort Myers, Florida; and El Paso, Texas.
Of course, this analysis is subject to 
the criticism that its results are only as 
good as the accuracy of the model. It is 
possible that the model's results are due to 
missing or misspecified variables. Still,
we believe that the model's results point 
us in the right direction.
Cluster Analysis
The next step in our exploratory 
research was to conduct a cluster analysis 
of the metropolitan areas, which sorts the 
areas into homogenous groups based on 
their fiscal, social, and demographic 
characteristics. The variables used in the 
analysis fall into four general categories: 
1) education policies, 2) quality of life, 3) 
governmental actions, and 4) change in 
economic conditions. This statistical 
analysis grouped the 261 metro areas into 
the eight clusters listed and briefly 
described below.
1) High sprawl, low growth (49 
MS As). The strongest shared 
characteristic of this group was that they 
have highly fragmented local 
governments.
2) Growth and prosperity (55 MS As). 
These MSAs share high growth and low 
poverty.
3) Low-living-costs hometowns (57 
MSAs). These areas share low population 
growth, low living costs, and low export 
activity.
4) Forgotten and distressed (45 
MSAs). The primary characteristic of 
these MSAs was a loss of public funding. 
In addition, they suffered from high 
poverty and ranked very low in terms of
Table 1 The Top 10 Small MSAs Achieving Higher-Than-Expected Growth 
in the 1990s (percent change in personal income, 1990-2000)
Metro area
Laredo, TX
Fayetteville, AR
Naples, FL
Boise City, ID
Austin, TX
Santa Fe, NM
Las Vegas, NV
Sioux Falls, SD
Raleigh, NC
Fayetteville, NC
Actual 
growth (%)
140.2
111.7
147.4
128.9
166.7
98.8
176.7
105.8
112.6
75.3
Predicted 
growth (%)
102.0
75.9
114.8
100.7
140.2
74.6
153.2
82.6
89.5
52.5
Difference 
(percentage point)
38.2
35.7
32.6
28.1
26.5
24.1
23.4
23.2
23.1
22.8
the percentage of their residents who 
completed college.
5) College places leaking graduates 
(12 MSAs). These MSAs attract young 
adults to their colleges but seemingly 
cannot retain them after they have 
graduated.
6) Creative-class college towns (26 
MSAs). These areas also attract young 
adults due to their colleges and 
universities but apparently are able to 
keep them longer after graduation.
7) Traditional employment centers (13 
MSAs). The unique feature of these 
MSAs is that they have no unique 
features.
8) Pulled by exogenous change (4 
MSAs). These MSAs are outliers that 
were seemingly impacted by an 
exogenous change in their economy.
Combining the results of the two 
models, we found that the MSAs 
performing better than expected were 
overrepresented in the "Growth and 
prosperity" and, surprisingly, in the 
"Traditional employment center" clusters. 
They were underrepresented in the "High 
sprawl, low growth" and the "Low-cost 
hometown" clusters.
Next Steps
We consider our research to be still in 
the exploratory stage of development. It is 
clear that more detailed case studies of the 
better performing metropolitan areas are 
warranted. We now have a better sense of 
where to look for possible effective local 
economic development policies, but we 
have not reached the stage of our project 
that allows us to identify them.
George A. Erickcek is senior regional 
analyst at the Upjohn Institute, and 
Hannah McKinney is an associate 
professor of economics and business at 
Kalamazoo College. This article is based 
on an Upjohn Institute Staff Working Paper 
by Erickcek and McKinney, entitled "Small 
Cities Blues: Looking for Growth Factors 
in Small and Medium-Sized Cities." To 
read the working paper in full, please go to 
http://www.upjohninstitute.org/ 
publications/wp/index.htm.
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Carl Davidson and Steven J. Matusz
Globalization, 
Adjustment, and 
Compensation
NOTE: This article highlights some of the 
research findings that appear in the 
authors' new book, International Trade 
and Labor Markets, which was published 
by the Upjohn Institute.
hile academicians generally 
argue that reducing trade barriers 
enhances aggregate welfare, legislation 
aimed at liberalizing trade often meets 
fierce opposition in public and political 
arenas. Counted among the opposition are 
groups concerned about the losses 
suffered by workers whose jobs disappear 
under the weight of import competition. 
Even academic economists, who tend to 
rail against protectionist sentiment, 
readily admit that freer trade does harm 
some groups, including those who 
become displaced.
Indeed, a burgeoning literature 
attempting to measure the losses to 
dislocated workers has produced some 
disquieting findings. For example, 
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) 
estimate that the average dislocated 
worker suffers a loss in expected lifetime 
income of $80,000. Kletzer (2001) finds 
similar but less-dramatic results. In her 
study, the average dislocated worker takes 
a 12 percent pay cut, while the median 
worker sees her wage fall by 5 percent. 
Troubled by such large personal losses, 
some academic economists have joined 
the growing movement in the policy 
community in calling for direct 
compensation of workers dislocated by 
trade liberalization. 1
For more than half a century the 
benefits of freer trade have been 
understood in the context of the
Samuelson compensation principle: the 
winners gain enough from liberalization 
to allow them to fully compensate the 
losers without exhausting all of their 
gains. 2 Thus, one way of viewing those 
who have been pushing for "wage 
insurance" for dislocated workers is that 
they are just taking this argument to its 
logical conclusion if we can afford to 
compensate these workers, we should. 3 
After all, if we choose to liberalize trade, 
we must realize that we are choosing to 
harm some groups. One might argue that 
equity requires coupling policies aimed at 
liberalizing trade with policies aimed at 
compensating displaced workers.
Not everyone would find an equity- 
based argument for compensation
"One might argue that equity
requires coupling policies aimed
at liberalizing trade with policies
aimed at compensating displaced
workers ... even in the absence
of equity considerations,
practical political considerations
suggest coupling liberalization
with compensation."
compelling. Some might point out that the 
dislocated workers were receiving 
economic rents when trade barriers 
protected their jobs, calling into question 
policies that would provide these workers 
with even more compensation by 
subsidizing them when they switch 
sectors. Even in the absence of equity 
considerations, practical political
considerations suggest coupling 
liberalization with compensation. Since 
those opposed to freer trade often fight 
against liberalization, an offer to 
compensate displaced workers for their 
losses might convince some groups to 
change their position and offer support 
instead, making freer trade easier to 
achieve.
The academic literature is surprisingly 
silent regarding the design of optimal 
policies aimed at compensating displaced 
workers. Indeed, there is only a modest 
amount of literature devoted to any issue 
related to compensating those harmed by
"The academic literature is
surprisingly silent regarding
the design of optimal policies
aimed at compensating
displaced workers."
liberalization.4 One reason is that the vast 
majority of all of the academic research 
connecting worker welfare and 
globalization begins from a premise of 
frictionless factor markets, where all 
adjustments that might be motivated by 
liberalization occur instantly. These 
models focus on the long run and leave no 
room to address many of the concerns 
outlined above.
In our monograph, International Trade 
and Labor Markets: Theory, Evidence, 
and Policy Implications (Davidson and 
Matusz 2004), we first show that 
traditional trade analysis can rather easily 
be extended to allow for equilibrium 
unemployment, job displacement, and 
gradual adjustment, and that doing so 
provides many new insights. We then use 
our extended model to tackle difficult 
issues such as the one raised above: if 
society desires to compensate those who 
are harmed by liberalization, what is the 
best way to go about it?
The general-equilibrium model that we 
use to address the issue of optimal 
compensation has several important 
components that are missing from 
standard trade models. In our model, 
workers must first train to acquire skills 
and then search for employment in either
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a "high-tech sector," where significant 
skills and training are required and wages 
are high, or a "low-tech sector," in which 
training is quick and cheap, far fewer 
skills are required, and pay is low. We 
assume that workers vary in ability, and 
we show that equilibrium results in all 
workers with ability above a critical level 
being drawn to the high-tech sector with 
all other workers in low-tech jobs.
To study the issue of adjustment and 
compensation, we assume that the low- 
tech sector is initially protected by a small 
tariff and then show that liberalization 
harms two groups: those low-tech
"... if society desires to
compensate those who are
harmed by liberalization, what is
the best way to go about it?"
workers who choose to shift to the high- 
tech sector (the movers), and those 
workers who remain trapped in the 
(previously protected) low-tech sector 
because they do not have enough skills to 
make the acquisition of high-tech jobs 
attractive (the stayers). The movers, who 
are the displaced workers in our setting, 
lose for two reasons. First, although some 
wind up with better-paying jobs after 
relocating, others take a pay cut when 
they find reemployment in the high-tech 
sector. Second, these workers bear all of 
the adjustment costs imposed on the 
economy by liberalization they must 
first retrain and then search for new jobs, 
both of which are costly processes.
We then turn to the issue of 
compensation by searching for the policy 
that fully compensates each group for 
their losses while imposing the smallest 
deadweight loss on the economy.5 One of 
the advantages of our model is that it is 
rich enough to allow us to compare all of 
the compensation programs that have 
been at the center of the policy debate: 
wage subsidies, employment subsidies, 
training subsidies, and unemployment 
insurance (which is basically what trade 
adjustment assistance has been in the 
United States).
We find that there are two rules that an 
optimal compensation program should 
satisfy. First, a program should have a 
large impact on the welfare of the average 
worker in the targeted group. If that is the 
case, then full compensation can be 
achieved with only a modest-sized 
program. Second, if we define the 
marginal worker to be the worker who is 
just indifferent between high- and low- 
tech jobs under free trade, then an optimal 
program should have only a small impact 
on this worker's welfare. The reason for 
this is that any compensation scheme 
distorts incentives and results in some 
workers making inefficient labor market 
decisions. If the marginal worker's 
welfare is largely insensitive to the policy 
measure, then full compensation can be 
achieved while generating only a small 
amount of labor misallocation.
Applying these two rules, we find that 
it is optimal to use a wage subsidy to 
compensate movers, whereas an 
employment subsidy (a subsidy to 
employed workers which is independent 
of the wage) works best to compensate 
the stayers. The main reason for the 
difference in the policy prescription has to 
do with the composition of the workforce 
in the two sectors: the high-tech sector is 
populated with high-ability workers,
"One of the advantages of our
model is that it is rich enough
to allow us to compare all of the
compensation programs that
have been at the center of
the policy debate: wage
subsidies, employment subsidies,
training subsidies, and 
unemployment insurance..."
whereas the low-tech sector attracts 
largely low-ability workers. As a result, 
the average high-tech worker has higher 
ability than the marginal worker, whereas 
the average low-tech worker has an 
ability level below that of the marginal 
worker. With a wage subsidy, the size of 
the transfer received by a worker is
increasing in the wage, which is 
increasing in ability. Thus, workers with 
high ability value wage subsidies more 
highly than their lower-ability 
counterpart. This makes the wage subsidy 
an attractive tool to use when 
compensating the movers the average 
mover will value the program much more 
than the marginal worker thus, a
"By formally modeling the
training and search processes
that are at the core of the
adjustment process, our
monograph is one of the first
rigorous treatments of the type
of policy concerns that arise
when we take into account
adjustment costs."
modest-sized program can be used, 
generating only a small amount of 
inefficient labor reallocation. In contrast, 
the wage subsidy will lead to too much 
labor reallocation if used to compensate 
the stayers. This is due to the fact that the 
marginal worker will value the wage 
subsidy considerably more than the 
average stayer (since the average stayer 
has lower ability than the marginal 
worker).
As there are no distortions in our 
model (other than the initial tariff), we 
know that the gains from trade are large 
enough to fully compensate those harmed 
by liberalization, but theory alone does 
not tell us if the costs of the compensation 
are large or small relative to the gains 
from trade. To get a handle on the relative 
magnitude of the costs of compensation, 
we close our monograph by calibrating 
the model using parameter estimates 
based on U.S. labor market data. We find 
that the overall cost to society is likely to 
be modest, (in terms of deadweight loss) 
provided the right policy is used. , 
However, attempting to compensate the 
losers might completely wipe out the 
gains from freer trade if the wrong policy 
is used.
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The continuing rapid pace of global 
integration brings with it a continuing 
flow of displaced workers. It is incumbent 
upon policy analysts to carefully consider 
the distribution and magnitude of 
adjustment costs that stem from global 
shocks, and to think deeply about the 
optimal design of policies targeted at 
reducing those costs. By formally 
modeling the training and search 
processes that are at the core of the 
adjustment process, our monograph is 
one of the first rigorous treatments of the 
type of policy concerns that arise when 
we take into account adjustment costs. 
Our hope is that our work demonstrates 
that such issues can be tackled in tractable 
settings, and that this will trigger other 
academics to start taking these issues 
more seriously.
Notes
1. See, for example, Jacobson, LaLonde, and 
Sullivan (1993); Parsons (2000); and Kletzer 
(2001).
2. This argument ignores the fact that such com 
pensation is rarely offered.
3. See, for example, Baily, Burtless, and Litan 
(1993); Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993); 
Burtless et al. (1998); Parsons (2000); Kletzer 
(2001); Kletzer and Litan (2001); and Hufbauer and 
Goodrich (2001).
4. There are a small number of papers that are 
relevant. First, there are those that ask whether the 
losers could be compensated by the winners without 
eating away all the gains from freer trade. Using a 
traditional full employment model of trade, Dixit 
and Norman (1980, 1986) have shown that there 
does indeed exist a commodity tax scheme that can 
achieve this objective thus, liberalization can lead 
to a true Pareto gain. However, Brecher and 
Choudhri (1994) and Feenstra and Lewis (1994) 
have raised concerns about whether this scheme will 
work when unemployment is present or factors of 
production are not perfectly mobile.
Second, a paper by Brander and Spencer (1994) 
focuses on the optimal design of a wage subsidy 
program aimed at compensating dislocated workers 
for their losses. In a simple partial equilibrium 
model in which the distribution of wages is held 
fixed, they compare wage subsidies programs in 
which the subsidy is tied to the gap between the pre- 
liberalization wage and the postliberalization wage 
earned by displaced workers. Their goal is to deter 
mine whether the subsidy should be an increasing or 
decreasing function of this gap. Their analysis finds 
support for the Lawrence and Litan (1986) position 
that the wage subsidy should be "tapered" that is, 
they show that the optimal subsidy is decreasing in 
the wage gap.
5. As noted above, society may wish to offer 
such compensation due to equity concerns or simply 
to make it easier to enact liberalizing legislation.
Both Carl Davidson and Steven Matusz are 
professors of economics at Michigan State 
University, and external research fellows 
with the Leverhulme Centre for Research 
on Globalization and Economic Policy at 
the University of Nottingham.
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Trade
and
Labor Markets
For information on how to order
this book, see p. 8 or visit
http://www.upjohninstitute.org/
publications/books .html.
Two additional books about the impact
of international trade on jobs in the
United States are also available from
the Institute: Imports, Exports, and
Jobs: What Does Trade Mean for
Employment and Job Loss ? by 
Lori G. Kletzer, and Job Creation, Job
Destruction, and International 
Competition, by Michael W. Klein, 
Scott Schuh, and Robert K. Triest.
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Mini-Grant Funded Research
The Upjohn Institute provides small levels 
of funding, titled Mini-Grants, intended to 
facilitate the research and publications of less 
experienced faculty. We will occasionally use 
Employment Research to feature work that 
has been partially supported by an Upjohn 
Institute mini-grant.
The Effect of Educational Vouchers
on Academic and 
Nonacademic Outcomes
Eric P. Bettinger
Robert L. Slonim
Case Western Reserve University
School vouchers are one of the most 
hotly contested policies for improving the 
educational opportunities of 
disadvantaged students. Academic 
literature on the effect of vouchers has 
focused primarily on student test scores. 
Although test scores are a valuable 
outcome, parents and school 
administrators understand that some of 
the most desirable effects of education 
are on behaviors not captured by these 
tests, such as generosity, patience, and 
self-confidence. This research provides 
new data and evidence on the effects 
of educational vouchers on both test 
scores and these other nonacademic 
behaviors.
Our research uses data from The 
Children's Scholarship Fund of Toledo 
(CSFT), a privately run voucher program 
in Ohio. In 1998, nearly 2,500 families, 
all of whom qualified for free/reduced 
lunch, applied for these vouchers. The 
Children's Scholarship Fund of Toledo 
awarded more than 1,000 scholarships by 
lottery. Because CSFT randomly chose 
the scholarship winners, we can use 
unsuccessful applicants as a comparison/ 
control group for the scholarship winners. 
Having a comparison group allows us to 
avoid the problem that voucher users may 
differ from other students in unobservable 
ways.
Our preliminary results show that 
winners' test scores are about 10 percent 
higher than unsuccessful applicants, that 
voucher winners are about twice as likely 
to attend private school after receiving the 
voucher, and that parents of voucher
winners are much more likely to be 
involved in their children's educations.
To measure the nonacademic 
behaviors of patience, generosity, and 
self-confidence, we use behavioral 
experiments with real financial 
consequences. In each experiment, 
students were given initial endowments of 
toy store gift certificates. We then allowed 
students to make decisions with real 
consequences. In a separate room, we 
simultaneously conducted identical 
experiments with the students' parents but 
offered cash instead of gift certificates. 
Within these experiments, we find that 
voucher winners are less confident and 
give larger amounts to charities. In our 
preliminary results, we also find only a 
small correlation between the children's 
and their parents' decisions.
An Empirical Analysis of Bargaining
with Voluntary Transmission
of Private Information
Paul Pecorino 
University of Alabama
Mark Van Boening 
University of Mississippi
Asymmetric information is a leading 
explanation of bargaining failures that 
result in costly disputes. These disputes 
include strikes and expensive trials or 
arbitration proceedings. In the context of 
civil litigation, Shavell (1989) has shown 
that the informed party to a dispute has an 
incentive to voluntarily reveal her private 
information if she has a strong case. 
When information can be revealed 
credibly and costlessly, Shavell finds that 
all disputes settle prior to trial. We 
empirically test Shavell's result with an 
experimental bargaining game. When we 
allow for costless and credible 
transmission of private information, we 
find that 80 percent of plaintiffs with 
strong cases reveal their information and 
that there is a significant reduction in the 
dispute rate. We also consider a "cheap 
talk" treatment in which transmitted 
information is not credible. In this 
treatment, we find (contrary to theory) 
that transmitted information is not totally 
ignored, but (consistent with theory) there 
is no drop in the dispute rate for any 
group of plaintiffs.
Our experimental design consists of a 
two-type version of the Shavell model. 
Plaintiffs have either a strong case or a 
weak case, where the dispute resolution 
mechanism can be thought of either as a 
civil trial or as a simple form of 
conventional arbitration in which offers 
do not affect the arbitration outcome. We 
choose parameter values such that in the 
absence of information transmission, 
theory predicts that weak plaintiffs settle 
and strong plaintiffs proceed to trial. Our 
results in this baseline experiment 
generally conform to the theory.
When information transmission is 
possible, theory predicts that plaintiffs 
with strong cases will voluntarily reveal 
their private information, and as a result 
their cases will eventually settle. In our 
experiment, almost 80 percent of these 
plaintiffs reveal their private information. 
For all plaintiffs with strong cases, the 
dispute rate falls from 87 percent under 
the baseline to 48 percent in the 
treatment. For those plaintiffs with strong 
cases who reveal their private 
information, the dispute rate drops to 35 
percent. Another important prediction of 
the theory is that silence is interpreted as 
having a weak case, and this is clearly 
supported by our data. Our experimental 
results give a fairly strong confirmation of 
Shavell's most important results, though 
some anomalies do emerge in the data.
Shavell's result is significant because it 
suggests which type of informational 
asymmetries would or would not be 
responsible for bargaining failure. In 
principle, evidence that can be credibly 
established to a court could also be credibly 
established prior to trial, though sanctions 
for perjury at trial may make it somewhat 
easier to do so in the courtroom. On the 
other hand, information on tastes (such as 
risk preferences) can be difficult to transmit 
prior to trial. Thus, asymmetric information 
on preferences is likely to persist even when 
opportunities for voluntary transmission of 
information exist.
Reference
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Books on Work/Family Issues
By a Thread
How Child Care Centers
Hold On to Teachers,
How Teachers Build
Lasting Careers
Marcy Whitebook and Laura Sakai
The authors examine how child care 
programs and their staff subsist in a 
field characterized by low pay, low 
status, and high 
turnover, and 
what the impacts 
of these factors 
are on the quality 
of child care 
provided. Their 
study is based on 
an in-depth 
survey of 75 mid 
size, relatively 
high-quality child care centers located 
in an economically thriving region.
Part I of the book focuses on staff 
departures and center quality. It relates 
the types and magnitude of turnover 
occurring among teachers at child care 
centers to the level of quality provided 
there. Part II relies on in-depth, 
quantitative evidence to examine the 
experience of child care employment.
Whitebook and Sakai point out 
interesting relationships between the 
characteristics of the child care 
workforce and those who have chosen 
to leave, stay, or join on. They then 
discuss work and family decisions that 
impact child care workers' career 
decisions, including the rewards listed 
by workers as reasons they remain 
employed in child care. The authors 
conclude with three policy 
recommendations that echo the 
suggestions made to them by the 
teaching staff and directors 
interviewed in their survey.
145 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-301-4 / $16 
paper ISBN 0-88099-300-6. 2004.
Kids at Work
The Value of
Employer-Sponsored
On-Site Child
Care Centers
Rachel Connelly, Deborah S. DeGraff, 
and Rachel A. Willis
Due to a 
variety of social 
and economic 
factors (e.g., 
welfare reform 
andtheEITC), a 
growing number 
of women found it 
necessary to enter 
the labor force 
during the last 25 
years. This includes a dramatic 
increase in the labor force participation 
rate of mothers with young children. 
Experts see this trend continuing, so 
the question becomes, "Who takes care 
of the children when a work/family 
conflict arises?"
Faced with a the tight labor market 
of the 1990s, a small but growing 
number of employers began offering 
on-site employer-sponsored child care 
(ESCC) as a way to attract enough 
workers to meet their staffing needs.
Connelly, DeGraff, and Willis 
examine the trends in the growth of 
such child care programs, then employ 
a case study approach to seek answers 
to a number of pertinent questions, 
including 1) Why do some firms offer 
ESCC while most firms do not? 
2) What is the value to firms offering 
ESCC? 3) What is the value to 
employees of working for a firm 
offering on-site child care?
180 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-305-7 / $17 
paper ISBN 0-88099-304-9 / 2004.
The Economics of 
Work and Family
Jean Kimmel and Emily P. Hoffman, 
Editors
Kimmel and Hoffman present a set 
of topical, nontechnical papers 
authored by nationally known experts 
in this field. Using an economic 
perspective, they confront work/family 
issues including child care (potentially 
the biggest 
obstacle to 
parents 
successfully 
integrating work 
and family 
priorities), how 
parents balance 
time between
___________ work and family 
obligations, links
between women's childbearing and 
their economic outcomes, the success 
of the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA), and the relationship between 
family structure and labor market 
outcomes. They also argue for specific 
policies designed to alleviate the 
stresses related to these issues. 
Included are
  Federal Child Care Policy, 
David M. Blau
• Thinking about Child Care Policy, 
Barbara Bergmann
• Parents' Work Time and the Family, 
Cordelia W. Reimers
• Fertility, Public Policy, and Mothers 
in the Labor Force 
Susan L. Averett
  How Family Structure Affects 
Labor Market Outcomes 
Joyce P. Jacobsen
  Working for All Families? Family 
Leave Policies in the United States, 
Katherin Ross Phillips.
191 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-246-8 / $15 
paper ISBN 0-88099-245-X / 2002.
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